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The next generation of environmental law should use economic
incentives to creatively stimulate innovation in environmental technology.
This Article proposes an environmental competition statute as a means of
stimulating movement toward a more sustainable future. Such a statute
would authorize those who achieve low emissions to collect the cost of
achieving low emissions plus a premium from competitors with higher
emissions.
This Article brieﬂy explains the value of using this mechanism. It then
canvasses the problems with the ﬁrst and second generation of
environmental law that an environmental competition statute can help us
overcome. A detailed description of an environmental competition statute
follows. The Article then turns to possible objections to the scheme not
addressed in the previous material. It closes with a brief conclusion.
I. VALUE OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL COMPETITION STATUTE
We have achieved a number of advances in material welfare because
entrepreneurs seek to get rich by developing and introducing innovations.
Examples include the cellular phone, the personal computer, and various
uses of the Internet. Innovators’ ability to gain market share through
productive change is limited only by their imagination and ability to
meet potential demand. Unfortunately, the free market rarely encourages
innovations improving the environment because they usually beneﬁt the
public as a whole rather than particular consumers paying for favorable
environmental changes.1
An environmental competition statute can potentially encourage contests
to improve environmental quality comparable to the ongoing competition to
realize other sorts of improvements. It aims to allow the capabilities of
innovators free rein in improving environmental quality. It makes it possible
for anybody reducing pollution to realize a proﬁt from doing so.
The statute also creates risks for those who fail to advance and innovate,
comparable to the risks faced by noninnovators in competitive markets
for nonenvironmental goods and services. Just as makers of mainframe
computers must adapt to the threat posed by personal computers or risk
losing market share, those who fail to adopt the latest environmental
technology should lose money to faster-moving competition. This statute
allows environmental innovators to prosper at the expense of environmental
laggards, thereby allowing environmental markets to function like other

1. See David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law 98–
102 (2003) (discussing the private market’s limitations in encouraging innovation protecting
the environment).
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competitive markets. In short, an environmental competition statute
encourages competition to improve the environment.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING LAW
Most existing law allows government ofﬁcials’ timidity to limit our
environmental achievements.2 The law authorizes federal and state
ofﬁcials to limit the amount of pollution facilities can emit. The ofﬁcials
administering these laws usually must take into account the costs our most
antiquated industry will face in thinking about mandating environmental
change.3 They rarely, however, actively consider the economic beneﬁts
that those with newer technologies might realize from substantial positive
environmental change when establishing new standards.4 As a result,
even when modernization would generate new jobs and greatly improve
the environment; government regulations only rarely demand signiﬁcant
changes in approach.
Government ofﬁcials often feel obliged when setting standards for an
entire industry to make sure that every company in an industry can meet
the standards it sets.5 Although the law authorizes and sometimes requires
regulations based on the achievements of the best performers,6 government
ofﬁcials tend to avoid aggressive regulation because of the political
problems that tough standards would create.7 Although in the market for
consumer goods competition tends to make the best performers the
trendsetters, in environmental law, laggards have a big inﬂuence on the
quality of environmental performance. This feeling of obligation leads to
standards that do not reﬂect the full capabilities industry possesses to

2. See id. at 112–22 (discussing the structure and economic dynamics of
government decision making in detail).
3. See, e.g., Nat’l Renderers Ass’n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1288–89 (8th Cir.
1976) (ﬁnding a water-pollution rule arbitrary because the EPA did not adequately
consider whether costs would affect the economic viability of medium-sized facilities).
4. Cf. Miguel Mendonca, Feed-in Tariffs: Accelerating the Deployment of
Renewable Nuclear Energy 43 (2007) (Germany’s feed-in tariff system to encourage
renewable energy created job growth in the renewable energy sector).
5. See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(reversing a performance standard because the EPA could not adequately show that its
limited data adequately took into account operational variables throughout the industry).
6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(3).
7. See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(remanding because EPA ignored statutory commands to show that all sources can
achieve the standards set under the most adverse conditions).
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improve environmental performance.8 Government ofﬁcials often base
their regulations on the technical capabilities of pollution control
technology. Government ofﬁcials often, however, have limited knowledge
of industry capabilities to improve environmental performance. As a
result, they tend to demand relatively modest improvement based on
well-understood technology. This has been the case, to some degree,
even under statutory provisions designed to force technology.9
The judiciary plays a role in exacerbating this problem because industry
regularly litigates to challenge rules limiting its pollution. Government
ofﬁcials know that courts can block implementation of rules if judges
ﬁnd the rules unreasonable.10 Although the relevant statutes only authorize
reversal of arbitrary and capricious discretionary decisions, courts
sometimes give rules a very hard look. Because ofﬁcials cannot predict
precisely how courts will apply the rather vague standards governing
judicial review of agency rules, they tend to shy away from stringent
requirements unless they have very good information indicating that
facilities have known techniques available for meeting them.
Many policy-makers associate this problem of government regulation
failing to encourage substantial innovation with command-and-control
regulation. But this timidity problem also limits the achievements of
emissions trading programs. Emissions trading programs require government
ofﬁcials to set limits on the amount of pollution that polluting facilities
emit.11 The emissions trading law then authorizes polluters subject to
those limits to avoid them if they purchase equivalent extra reductions
from other facilities, which makes it possible to meet bureaucratically
8. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
9. David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32
B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2005) (explaining how judicial demands for a rational
basis for technology-based rules have limited technology forcing). Bruce La Pierre,
Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV.
771, 805–31 (1977) (contending that judicial requirements that agencies identify at least
one technology capable of achieving their promulgated standards limited agencies’
ability to force technology); cf. Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88
YALE L.J. 1713, 1718–19 (1979) (claiming that state plans did force some technological
improvement).
10. See generally Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review
of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999).
11. See Michael Grubb et al., Allowance Allocation in the European Emissions
Trading Scheme: A Commentary, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 127, 127 (2005) (describing the
“allocation of allowances” as “the most ...important step” for “any emissions trading
system”); David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?
Beyond the Economic Incentive/Command and Control Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 289, 324 (1998); Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (describing the need for limits as a “necessary aspect” of “any” emissions trading
program).
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chosen limits efﬁciently. Government ofﬁcials develop the emission limits
with the costs to old established industry of making changes very much
in mind. They therefore usually make demands that do not require basic
technological changes signiﬁcantly improving societal welfare. For
example, Title IV of the Clean Air Act includes a very well designed
emissions trading program for sources of sulfur dioxide causing acid
rain. This program has produced some of the reductions needed to address
the ecological problems acid rain causes, but it has not encouraged
substantial movements toward modern renewable energy technologies.12
Rather, it has encouraged traditional end-of-the-pipe controls (scrubbers)
and some modest pollution prevention (low sulfur coal).13 The acid rain
program has not made the purveyors of the most promising innovative
environmental technologies rich. So, it has not functioned to produce the
kind of wide-open competition that has enriched people with new ideas
providing material beneﬁts to consumers.14
The same problem of government timidity limits the efﬁcacy of pollution
taxes. Economists support pollution taxes as an efﬁcient environmental
protection instrument. If the traditional U.S. antipathy toward taxes ever
abated sufﬁciently to allow a pollution tax law to pass at all, government
ofﬁcials would have to choose the tax rates to apply to pollution. They
would probably ﬁnd it politically difﬁcult to set rates sufﬁciently high to
stimulate signiﬁcant innovation in environmentally friendly technologies.
Existing law does not provide a continuous incentive to innovate and
go beyond compliance.15 Even in an emissions trading program, once the
operators of facilities regulated by the program have met government set
12. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID
RAIN PROGRAM 130 (2000).
13. See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33
ENVT’L L. REP. 10,094, 10,105 (2003); Byron Swift, Command without Control: Why
Capand-Trade Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVT’L L.
REP. 10,330, 10,332 (2001) (describing scrubbers and low-sulfur coal as the principal
compliance techniques).
14. Cf. Margaret R. Taylor, Edward S. Rubin, & David A. Hounshell, Regulation
as the Mother of Invention: The Case of SO2 Control, 27 LAW & POL’Y 348, 370 (2005)
(ﬁnding less innovation under the acid rain program than under the commandand-control
regime preceding it); David Popp, Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act
of 1990, 22 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 641 (2003) (ﬁnding more patenting of environmental
technology under command and control than under the acid rain trading program, but
ﬁnding a different type of innovation under trading).
15. See Driesen, supra note, at 10,099–101 (explaining in detail why a trading
program fails to provide continuous incentives for environmental improvement); Driesen,
supra note 9, at 324–27 (same).
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pollution limits by purchasing credits from overcomplying plants or
through local reductions, no incentive exists to go further.16 Because of
this limited demand for credits, only a limited incentive exists to
overcomply; rational polluters will only produce as many credits as
noncomplying facilities need to achieve compliance, not more. The
incentive to improve environmental performance lasts only until the
compliance deadline comes up. Emissions trading provides no incentives
for net reductions beyond those envisioned by government ofﬁcials, who
set caps with limited information about private-sector capacity for
innovation.
Proponents of emissions trading often assert that government ofﬁcials
can remedy the lack of incentive for continuous innovation by setting new
limits that apply after a compliance deadline expires. But setting new limits
can be politically difﬁcult. Industry can avoid cost by opposing fresh limits,
and it frequently does so.17 Because government responses to the pressures
it faces are unpredictable, government regulation, whether by emissions
trading or conventional approaches, does not provide a secure climate for
investment and deployment of innovative environmental technologies, even
though it has secured some signiﬁcant incremental improvement and
occasional innovations.18
Pending climate change legislation, if enacted, may provide a more
secure climate for investment than previous trading programs because of
the presence of meaningful long-term targets. But such targets are unlikely
to be wholly adequate to address climate change. Even in the rare case when
a trading program provides a good climate for long-term investment, an

16. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 8–9 & n.33 (1991)
(recognizing that emissions trading tends to reach an equilibrium).
17. Accord Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism
and the Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329,
1359 (1996) (noting the pressures that bureaucrats face to overallocate allowances in a
trading scheme); see, e.g., Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic
Approaches: The Ideal Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading and an Analysis of the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and
the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 902–03 (2005) (describing
California’s RECLAIM program as a failure because caps were set too high); Axel
Michaelowa & Sonja Butzengeiger, EU Emissions Trading: Navigating Between Scylla
and Charybdis, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 5 (2005) (explaining how lobbying in the European
Union led to goals in the ﬁrst phase of its emissions trading scheme that provided for
little departure from business-as-usual levels of carbon emissions); Grubb et al., supra
note 11, at 132–33 (same); Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (involving a claim to additional emission allowances); Indianapolis Power &
Light Co. v. EPA, 58 F.3d 643, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); Madison Gas & Elec. Co.
25 F.3d 526, 526 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Mononganhela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F.3d
272, 272–74 (4th Cir. 1992).
18. See Driesen, supra note 13, at 10,103–05.
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environmental competition statute can usefully supplement and make up
for weaknesses in the cap.
A tax program can provide a continuous reduction incentive but only
for a limited class of innovation, those with marginal costs less than the
marginal tax rate. Taxes would not provide good incentives for important,
cutting-edge technologies that require signiﬁcant investments, putting
their marginal costs above marginal tax rates, even if such investments
would lower costs and improve environmental quality in the long run.
The idea for an environmental competition statute arises from experience
with second-generation economic incentives. These incentives fall into
two categories—negative incentives that penalize pollution, such as
pollution taxes, and positive incentives that reward pollution reductions,
such as subsidies. Environmental law, however, functions most dynamically
when negative economic incentives fund positive economic incentives.
Governments occasionally enacted or considered such programs during
the second generation of environmental law. Thus, New Zealand, for
example, imposed licensing fees on ﬁshing, a negative economic incentive,
and used the revenue from these fees to pay ﬁshermen to retire, a positive
economic incentive.19 France taxed water pollution and used some of the
revenue to fund wastewater treatment. The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, an emissions trading program limiting greenhouse gas emissions
from electric utilities in the northeastern United States, features auctioning
of emission allowances, and states may use these revenues to fund
energy-efﬁciency improvements.20 The California legislature considered
a program, Drive +, that would impose fees on consumers purchasing
energy-inefﬁcient vehicles and give those fees to consumers purchasing
energy-efﬁcient vehicles as a rebate.21 And ﬁnally, New Hampshire ofﬁcials
considered an Industry Average Performance System, which would
redistribute pollution taxes to low-polluting companies. An environmental
competition statute seeks to build on these cutting-edge, second-generation
reforms to stimulate increased innovation.

19. See Tom Tietenberg, Using Economic Incentives to Maintain our Environment, 33
CHALLENGE 42, 43 (1990).
20. See David M. Driesen, The Changing Climate for United States Law, 1
CLIMATE CHANGE L. REV. 33, 38 (2007) (discussing movement toward auctioning under
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative).
21. Nathaniel Greene & Venessa Ward, Getting the Sticker Price Right: Incentives
for Cleaner, More Efﬁcient Vehicles, 12 PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 289, 346 (1998).
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Increased innovation is important, because innovation increases our
capacity to address environmental problems over time and can reduce
the cost of doing so. Yet economists recognize that markets generally
stimulate insufﬁcient innovation. The reason for this is that developers
of innovation cannot capture all of the beneﬁts that innovation creates
for society. These positive spillovers (beneﬁts that do not generate rents
for the innovator) arise because innovations can contribute knowledge
that spurs additional innovation by competitors.22 These observations
about markets’ limits in spurring innovation apply to the markets in
pollution control technology that ﬁrst-generation performance standards
create and to the markets that second-generation emissions trading programs
create. The value of innovation and the limits of markets in encouraging
it suggest the need for creative measures to stimulate innovation, such as
an Environmental Competition Statute.
III. A DESCRIPTION OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPETITION STATUTE
This section begins with a description of the statute’s basic features
and the rationale for them. It then discusses a host of design issues that a
legislature creating such a statute would face. In general, these issues are
similar to issues that policy makers confront in designing other marketbased and traditional regulatory programs.
IV. THE BASICS
An environmental competition statute would aim to stimulate a race to
the top—a competition to develop and deploy environmentally superior
technology. To stimulate this race, an environmental competition statute
authorizes those producing products or services with low emissions to
collect fees from competitors with higher emissions. These fees should
be sufﬁcient to fund the full cost of using and developing an environmentally
superior approach and should provide a premium beyond that amount.
Thus, the law would have two components. First, it would set out a
requirement that a relatively high polluter pay any low-polluting competitor
requesting a fee. The fee should be a dollar amount equal to the amount

22. See Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation and Intellectual
Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMPLE J. ENVTL. L. & TECH.
51, 56 (2006) (if a person “builds a better mousetrap,” others may copy it); RICHARD A.
POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 123–24 (2004) (third parties’ ability to use
information makes it difﬁcult for inventors to keep all the value their inventions create).
See generally Brett Frischman & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257
(2007).
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the low-polluting competitor spent to achieve lower emissions than the
higher polluter. The low polluter could demand this fee from any higherpolluting competitor it chooses. Second, the legislation would set out a
premium that the high polluter must pay beyond the low polluter’s cost.
For example, the law could require that, on demand, any polluter with
higher emissions than the competing company making the demand must
pay the low polluter the cost it incurred to achieve low emissions plus 10
percent of its abatement costs.
This approach would allow environmental markets to emulate the
economic dynamics of highly competitive markets. In such markets,
ﬁrms innovate to take market share from other ﬁrms. When they
innovate successfully, they in effect take money from their competitors,
as their revenues increase and their competitors’ revenues diminish. The
environmental competition statute’s transfer payment provision creates
this same effect for environmental goods.
Absent such a statute, environmental markets do not produce freewheeling competition for market share to fully meet consumer demand
for environmental goods. Consumers want environmental beneﬁts, but
because these beneﬁts are public goods, consumers cannot purchase them in
free markets. Thus, I may want clean air, but I cannot pay anybody to
produce it. No one party can provide me with clean air, because dirty air
comes about as a result of the actions of multiple actors, all or most of
whom must clean up to produce clean air. This public character of
environmental goods (and bads) distinguishes them from private goods,
like air conditioners, that one can purchase from a single party.
Government regulation serves to stimulate provision of the public
good of environmental quality. But it does so through a less dynamic
mechanism than competition to seize market share. It creates a demand
for a discrete government-mandated environmental improvement, which
can, as we have seen, be inadequate and take insufﬁcient advantage of
private-sector capacity to produce environmental improvements.
The kind of economic dynamic an environmental competition statute
provides is powerful. It uses fear and greed to motivate innovation,
combining an opportunity for proﬁt for innovators with a risk of loss for
those who fail to innovate as quickly as their competitors. By doing this,
it allows environmental law to emulate the most widely admired feature
of free markets, their tendency to stimulate technological advances
bettering our lives. Free markets in private goods likewise depend on
fear and greed to motivate technological advancements. Opportunities
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for proﬁt and fear of loss stimulate the risk taking that must occur to
create signiﬁcant technological advances.
Absent such a statute, each polluter often must internalize (pay for)
the cost of pollution control itself. But it may externalize (pass on to
others) the costs of pollution—a degraded environment and serious public
health problems. This asymmetry discourages cleanup. An environmental
competition statute allows polluters to systematically externalize the costs
of pollution control, just as polluters can now externalize pollutions’
costs. This cost externalization frees them to employ all their ingenuity
to cleanup.
Sound principles support the idea of an environmental competition
statute. In confronting environmental problems, we should “do the best
we can.”23 Too often, however, we settle for mediocre environmental
standards—standards that demand some improvement but not nearly as
much as the market is capable of delivering. This statute tends to foster
technological progress by letting the cutting-edge innovators set the pace.
Just as in a market for consumer goods and services, a ﬁrm must keep up
with what the best ﬁrms are doing or lose money, this statute likewise
requires ﬁrms to match the achievements of their best environmental
competitors or risk ﬁnancial consequences. This statute allows ﬁrms to
proﬁt from environmental leadership and encourages them to truly do
the best they can in advancing environmental quality.
An environmental competition statute also helps overcome problems
inherent in the economic dynamics of regulation. Frequently, ﬁrms resist
regulation en masse, and all regulated ﬁrms share an interest in defeating
enforcement. Because we all ﬁnance ﬁrms’ antienvironmental litigation
and lobbying when we purchase the goods they make, they have a lot of
money to use in thwarting progress. The environmental competition
statute should make about half of the polluting ﬁrms into enforcers of the
statute. It promises distinct economic beneﬁts to the cleanest ﬁrms, which
may lead some ﬁrms to support such a statute. In these ways, the
environmental competition statute seeks to overcome the economic dynamics
at the heart of regulatory failure to keep pace with environmentally
destructive activities.24
23. See A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
PROJECT OF THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 57–70 (Christopher H. Schroeder
& Rena Steinzor eds., 2004) (discussing this concept as a principal to guide
environmental law).
24. See Driesen, supra note 1, at 113–35 (analyzing the dynamics of this failure in
detail). Cf. DAVID GOLDSTEIN, SAVING ENERGY GROWING JOBS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION PROMOTES ECONOMIC GROWTH, PROFITABILITY, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITION
172–76 (2007) (explaining how trade associations repress competition to proﬁt from
environmental protection and pressure the government to adopt weak standards or none
at all).
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V. DESIGN ISSUES
A. Scope
The legislature may make the obligation to pay low-polluting competitors
a general requirement for all classes of pollutants and industries, or may
instead focus on a particular industry and set of pollutants of concern.
Congress (or a state legislature) could, for example, enact an environmental
competition statute to focus on all emitters of carbon dioxide, the most
important greenhouse gas causing global warming. The owner of a new
solar plant, for example, could collect all of the costs of plant construction
from owners of existing power plants with higher emissions plus a
premium—a dollar amount written into the legislation to provide a proﬁt
margin for each low emitter. Similarly, makers of vehicles with low
carbon dioxide emissions could demand that the makers of vehicles with
higher emissions pay the additional costs associated with making their
vehicles lower emitting.
Design questions will arise about how to deﬁne the class of polluters
with responsibilities and opportunities under the environmental competition
statute, just as they do under traditional regulation and in market-based
programs. Thus, for example, a program that focuses only on emissions
characteristics built into cars will not allow consumers, who may inﬂuence
emissions through their driving behavior, to play in this market. Such a
choice may be justiﬁable in all of these contexts because of the difﬁculty
of monitoring and regulating individual driving behavior. But it means
that we should bear in mind that none of these approaches is a panacea
that works for all facets of all programs. We should, however, in deﬁning
polluters for purposes of environmental competition, try to capture as
much of the pollution generated throughout the life cycle as is feasible.
For simplicity’s sake, it may be wise to authorize those who clean up
to collect fees from any polluter that they choose to target, but require that
they choose only a single polluter. The cleaner company will likely
choose high-polluting and well-capitalized targets, as it will be easy to
prove that they are cleaner than a very dirty company, and it will be
easiest to collect from a wealthy company. One could use variation in
the premium paid to cleaner companies to encourage collection from the
dirtiest companies, but this would either require complicated legislative
line drawing or very difﬁcult data collection by the polluter trying to recover
its costs.
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Congress (or a state legislature) could enact the environmental
competition statute without amending any existing law. It would be a
means of supplementing basic obligations with incentives to go beyond
those obligations, or of encouraging new efforts where little has been done
(e.g., global warming).
The legislation, however, would function best if it addressed some
matters of detail. The legislation might deﬁne the pollutants and/or
industries it applies to. It would be important to deﬁne the industry in
terms of broad functions (e.g., the personal vehicle transportation industry),
not speciﬁc market niches (e.g., sport-utility-vehicle makers). The whole
point is to force transfer payments between companies on the basis of
environmental performance in meeting basic consumer needs. This requires
identiﬁcation of the bounds of an industry, as only competitors must pay
a low-polluting ﬁrm under this approach. Because consumers buying
cars have a choice between sedans and sport-utility vehicles, for example,
deﬁning a category to include all forms of personal transportation makes
sense.
This legislation will be most helpful in areas where we anticipate the
need for very signiﬁcant technological change. Climate change is such
an area. Scientists suggest that we will need more than a 50 percent cut
in global emissions below 1990 levels by 2050 to avoid dangerous climate
change.25 Because developing countries’ emissions are expected to rise
during most of this period, this may require cuts of 80 percent or more in
developed countries’ emissions. Because carbon dioxide emissions constitute
about 80 percent of the gases on the basis of warming potential, this implies
a massive move away from fossil fuels. Such a move will require major
technological changes. Other areas may also beneﬁt from such an approach.
B. Metrics
The environmental competition statute will have to provide some
guidance about how to compare the emissions of competing ﬁrms. The
measurement issue is not fundamentally different from issues in traditional
regulation, where we also must ﬁgure out how to measure emissions and
fairly take into account differences among ﬁrms. But in the context of
25. See James E. Hansen, A Slippery Slope: How Much Global Warming
Constitutes “Dangerous” Anthropogenic Interference, 68 CLIMATE CHANGE 269, 277
(2005) (stating that a two-degree Celsius temperature rise “almost surely takes us well
◦
into the realm of dangerous” climate change); Malte Meinshausen, What Does a 2 C
Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief Analysis Based on Multi-Gas
Emission Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in Avoiding
Dangerous Climate Change 269–70 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al. eds., 2006)
(estimating that limiting temperature rise to less than two degrees Celsius likely requires
a 55 percent reduction below 1990 emission levels by 2050).
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environmental competition, we may proﬁtably treat some of the issues a
little differently than we have in other contexts.
An important aspect of the measurement problem involves the choice
of a metric on which to base comparisons. A mass-based metric will not
work terribly well in this context. Suppose, for example, that one power
plant generates one hundred tons of carbon dioxide per year and another
generates two hundred tons of carbon dioxide per year. One might think
that it would be appropriate to consider the two-hundred-ton facility as
the facility with higher emissions, and allow the hundred-ton facility to
collect fees from the two-hundred-ton facility. This might, however,
be inappropriate. Suppose that the two-hundred-ton facility provides
electricity to a million people and the hundred-ton facility provides
electricity to just one thousand people. It does not seem fair, in such a
situation, to consider the larger facility the higher emitter just because it
is big and supplies a lot of customers. A better metric would be tons of
carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour per year. This would normalize emissions
by the amount of pollution per unit of output. In general, this should be
the approach. We should measure and compare emissions by the mass of
emissions generated annually per unit of output.
This sort of issue arises outside of the environmental competition statute
as well. For example, in designing principles for allocating reduction
obligations to electric utilities as part of the proposed U.S. cap-and-trade
program addressing climate disruption, legislators rejected an allocation
formula based on the amount of electricity generated, recognizing that
such an approach penalizes utilities that have low per capita emissions
because they have funded energy efﬁciency. Accordingly, some of the
bills included energy-efﬁciency-based adjustments to the electricity-output
allocation formula. The per-customer approach seeks to accomplish the
same thing in a simpler way.
We could deﬁne the unit of output differently, in terms of numbers of
customers served in various categories (e.g., residential and industrial).
This would prove more complicated to administer fairly but would provide
incentives to pay for energy-efﬁciency improvements, as these would
reduce the amount of emissions per customer. These sorts of issues,
what metric to choose, are not unique to the environmental competition
statute; they also inﬂuence the incentives provided by trading programs
and traditional regulation. But in all contexts, wise choices of metrics
can make incentives more or less powerful and design more or less
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complicated, as they do when regulators design other market-based
programs or traditional performance standards.
Another threshold issue involves deciding whether to focus on emission
levels or emission reductions. This issue, too, has its counterparts in existing
regulatory programs. Regulators setting a traditional ﬁrst-generation
performance standard can focus on future emission reductions by
demanding even percentage reductions from ﬁrms, meaning that clean
ﬁrms must clean up just as much as dirty ﬁrms (in percentage terms) to
escape liability. Alternatively, they can set absolute uniform emission
limits, which require signiﬁcant reductions in ﬁrms with high baseline
emissions but much fewer reductions (or none at all) from relatively
clean plants.26 The environmental competition statute likewise could use
emission levels as the trigger for liability, authorizing low emitters to
collect payments from high emitters. Alternatively, the statute could
employ an emissions reduction approach, basing payments on relative
amounts of emission reductions after the program was enacted. For
reasons that appear below, a properly designed emissions-level approach
functions much better than the emission reduction approach.
The emissions-level approach maximizes pressure on dirty plants to
clean up. It makes them immediately vulnerable to demands for payment, even without their cleaner competitors undertaking any new projects,
because dirty plants will, at the outset, have more emissions than clean
ones. If this approach is used, the statute should give plants a few years
before any demands for payment can be made to give owners of relatively
dirty plants a chance to clean up to escape fee-payment obligations.
An emission reduction approach works less well because it may
grandfather in existing emissions. Under this approach, a very dirty coalﬁred power plant could reduce emissions and claim a penalty from a
natural gas power plant that produced fewer emission reductions, even if
the gas-ﬁred power plant has lower emission levels (as gas is inherently
cleaner than coal). It minimizes economic dynamic pressure for fundamental
technological changes (e.g., fuel choices) and maximizes fairness to
existing polluters. It fails to force signiﬁcant change because it accepts
the status quo baseline as a given. Worse, in some contexts, it can reward
dirty facilities at the expense of clean competition. For example, under
this approach, an existing coal-ﬁred power plant could reduce its emissions
slightly and then collect the cost of doing that from a zero-emission solar
facility, which cannot reduce its emissions (as it is impossible to go
below zero emissions). Where such perverse outcomes are likely, the

26. See Driesen, supra note 1, at 193–95 (discussing the differences between
percentage reduction and ﬁxed-level standards).
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emission reduction approach should not be used. By contrast, an emissionslevel approach maximizes pressures for environmental advances.
C. Monitoring and Reporting
As with emissions trading, pollution taxes, and performance standards,
an environmental competition statute relies on accurate monitoring and
reporting of pollution levels. The environmental competition statute, like
other economic-incentive-based approaches, will work best in contexts
in which reliable monitoring or estimation is feasible. Provisions in the
statute should require the use of the best monitoring techniques available. In
addition, polluters must report their pollution, not just to the government,
but also to their competitors. This reporting will make it possible for
competitors to compare emissions for the sake of planning environmental
improvements to avoid fees, and for the sake of deciding who to seek
fees from after a low pollution level is achieved. The reporting should take
the form of regular postings on an Internet page accessible to all. Because
the statute should be based on comparisons of pollution per unit of output
level, the reporting should cover both emissions and production numbers.
D. Deﬁnition of Competitors
The environmental competition statute needs to deﬁne competitive
markets for the sake of establishing who may collect fees from whom.
Existing environmental law generally regulates polluters in an industry
category, often deﬁned by standard industrial classiﬁcation (SIC) codes.
SIC codes, however, do not comprehensively identify all ideally relevant
competitors in a system designed to reward environmentally friendly
innovation and apply negative economic incentives to dirtier means of
meeting the same consumer goal. In some cases, SIC codes will be too
narrow and in some cases too broad. Ideally, someone who develops, for
example, a system of integrated pest management (IPM) that makes it
possible to increase crop yields with little or no pesticide use should be
able to collect a payment from pesticide manufacturers that compete
with him or her to increase crop yields. Even if the IPM developers operate
a research farm and the pesticide manufacturer operates a pesticide
plant, the statute should regard them as competitors (or allow courts to
develop a common law of competition based on broad principles).
The application of the statute to a well-deﬁned group of polluters and
pollutants with very clear speciﬁc deﬁnitions of competitors would
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minimize disputes about who is a competitor. But broader deﬁnitions of
competitors would produce much more innovation and fundamental change
in how we deliver goods and services to consumers.
E. Discouraging Collusion
The legislation should forbid communication among competitors about
how ﬁrms plan to respond to the environmental competition statute.
Otherwise, legislators might agree to do nothing, thereby eliminating the
incentives to compete. Violation of the provisions should carry very heavy
penalties, including jail terms for individuals who commit deliberate
violations. Such communication should be regarded as proof of a
conspiracy to prevent environmental competition in violation of antitrust
principles. Absent such conspiracies, some companies with advanced
environmental capabilities will likely seize the opportunity to extract
payments from competitors, thereby starting the race to the top. Firms
who do not view themselves as environmentally advanced may start
beeﬁng up their emission-reducing activities out of fear of becoming a
target.
F. Minimizing Litigation
The legislation should also seek to minimize litigation by providing a
dispute settlement mechanism, perhaps through mandatory arbitration.
Disputes may arise as to who is a competitor and who has the lowest
emissions. Those using continuous monitoring should be presumed to
have lower emissions than competitors, unless the competitor can prove
otherwise. This will encourage reliable monitoring. Still, legitimate
disputes about how to estimate or measure emissions may arise. So, it is
desirable to see to it that these quarrels do not become so time consuming as
to blunt the program’s effects. On the other hand, actions to reduce
pollution to get transfer payments or to avoid having to become a payer
of one can prove productive even if ﬁnal settlement is delayed.
The environmental competition statute will not generate complicated
environmentally fruitless disputes. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, otherwise known as
Superfund, has a reputation for generating vexing disputes. This U.S.
federal law makes a variety of parties associated with a toxic waste site
responsible for that site’s cleanup. This has often led to protracted
disputes about how to apportion liability among potentially responsible
parties.
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Superfund, however, has been a notable success in encouraging parties
not to create new toxic waste dumps since its enactment in 1980.27 The
environmental competition statute would likely stimulate a comparable
scramble to avoid liability. The principle causes of protracted disputes
and high transaction costs under Superfund would not exist under the
environmental competition statute. Allocating responsibility under
Superfund has proved difﬁcult because obtaining good information about
the past history of toxic waste dumps (e.g., who dumped, who allowed
dumping) has proved difﬁcult and the program creates great uncertainty
about the eventual cleanup’s scope. By contrast, the environmental
competition statute will apply to facilities where the responsibility for
pollution clearly belongs with the owner of the facility. It usually will
not prove difﬁcult to determine pollution levels, because pollution is
ongoing, not past, and liability will arise only after cleanup is completed
and documented and the costs completely known. Furthermore, one can
structure the environmental competition statute to limit the parties involved
to as few as two—one defendant and one plaintiff, thus avoiding the
multiparty litigation that has bedeviled the Superfund program.
VI. CONCERNS THAT SUCH A STATUTE MAY RAISE
Competition offers great prospects for gains and advancements. But it
also involves change. And change can excite fear. This section addresses
some of the concerns that the environmental competition statute may
bring to the forefront.
VII. JOBS
Although an environmental competition statute may increase jobs in
companies employing new low-emission approaches, it can conceivably
cause job losses and even bankruptcy in high-pollution companies. In
other areas of life, we accept occasional job losses as the price to pay for
improvement.
Hence, nobody argued that we should throttle the personal computer
to stave off job losses in the typewriter industry. If we accept these sorts

27. See Klaus Lindegaard, Environmental Law, Environmental Globalization, and
Sustainable Techno-Economic Evolution, in ENVIRONMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 141 (Andrew Tylecote & Jan van Der Straaten eds., 1998) (reporting a 51.8
percent reduction in waste generation between 1981 and 1985).
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of consequences as the price of progress in delivering better consumer
goods or services, we should accept them, when necessary, as a sometimesnecessary cost of environmental progress.
Congress (or a state legislature) could, however, seek to protect workers
from some of competition’s potential consequences, just as Congress
has protected workers from the consequences of other market-based
environmental measures. When Congress enacted the acid-rain trading
program, it recognized that the ﬂexibility the program offered electric
utilities would probably lead to more use of low-sulfur coal. Although
this was good for miners in regions producing low-sulfur coal, it was not
good for miners in regions producing high-sulfur coal. Decreased demand
for high-sulfur coal could lead to job losses in the regions producing it.
Accordingly, Congress provided transitional assistance to high-sulfur
coal miners when it passed the acid rain program.
If Congress wishes to protect workers from the consequences of
competition, however, the legislation providing this protection should
reach all form of competition, not just environmental competition. If we
wish to have a more humane policy with respect to the disruptions a
competitive economy gives rise to in people’s lives, it should be a broad
form of protection that helps workers hurt by all sorts of market change,
not just change produced by environmental laws creating competitive
market dynamics.
VIII. RISK-RISK TRADE-OFFS
When an environmental competition statute targets one form of pollution,
those reducing or eliminating the target pollutant may respond with
measures that create different risks from those which the statute targeted.
This problem is not unique to environmental competition statutes; it arises
under ﬁrst-and second-generation programs as well. Still, regulators
should anticipate problems that might arise under such a statute. For
example, if they do not wish to encourage payments from coal-ﬁred power
plant operators to nuclear power plants, because of the risks involved in
nuclear power, they should draft provisions prohibiting that. Unanticipated
problems, however, can arise in any program that affords industry
technological choices.28

28. See David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input
Limits, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65 (2009).
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IX. COST
The environmental competition statute prototype I have outlined lacks
a clear cost constraint. Under the pure form of this approach sketched
earlier, clean producers can collect the cost of their cleanliness from
dirty competitors no matter how costly the clean approach happened to
be. A lack of cost constraint may be useful when addressing extremely
serious problems that require substantial innovation, like global warming.
In practice, however, such a statute would not produce entirely
unconstrained costs.29 Producers seeking to introduce cleaner processes
must make sure that those processes are not so expensive to operate as to
bankrupt them. If they go bankrupt, they are not a competitor that can
claim compensation for cleanup. They also must spend money before
they collect it and some risk exists that their competition may cleanup as
well, so there remains some risk in spending too much without realizing
sufﬁcient improvements to collect from a competitor with some ﬁnancial
capability to make the required payments. Even though these economic
constraints will apply in practice, the statute will still leave opportunities
for those conﬁdent that they can beat their competitors’ environmental
performance without insane expenditures.
Additional cost constraints would limit the statute’s effectiveness but
still leave scope for signiﬁcant improvements. The best way to provide
an additional cost constraint is to make after the fact adjustments if costs
prove excessive. An ex post approach to cost adjustment would make the
program respond to actual costs rather than cost projections, which often
prove inaccurate. This constitutes a substantial advantage. The adjustments
could include suspending the program, putting a price cap on transfer
payments, or limiting the premium paid above the cost of pollution control.
All of these measures, however, would compromise the program’s
environmental effectiveness.
X. GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE
A jurisdiction enacting an environmental competition statute must also
decide how to address emissions generated by activities outside the jurisdiction enacting the law. This concern arises because most markets feature
competition across geographic boundaries. These issues are complicated
enough that identifying an industry with substantial competition solely
29.

See Driesen, supra note 1, at 158.
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within a jurisdiction as a target for early experiments with the environmental
competition statute concept commends itself as a strategy. Under this
approach, only facilities in the regulating jurisdiction could collect fees,
and only facilities with that jurisdiction would have to pay. We will see,
however, that it is possible to handle interjurisdictional competition more
robustly.
Before describing the interjurisdictional issues and ways to address
them, it is worth noting that traditional environmental law, including
emissions trading, faces similar issues.30 Thus, for example, when the
EPA required the reformulation of gasoline to reduce air emissions from
cars, effectiveness required that reﬁners outside the United States also
reformulate their gasoline.31 Otherwise, gasoline from foreign reﬁners
sold in the United States would undermine the program’s effectiveness.
Accordingly, the United States required foreign reﬁners to comply.32
Similarly, traditional regulation has to address transboundary impacts of
production facilities’ direct pollution, and it usually has done so by some
process of agreements among jurisdictions. Yet we shall see that these
old issues take a slightly different shape in the context of an environmental
competition statute.
It seems clear that a government has jurisdiction to demand that polluters
within its territory pay polluters with lower emissions, as required by an
environmental competition statute. This jurisdiction would sufﬁce to
justify demanding that polluters within the jurisdiction enacting an
environmental competition statute pay polluters outside the jurisdiction
with lower emissions as well as polluters within it. But the question of
whether a jurisdiction can demand payments from polluters outside its
jurisdiction to polluters within the jurisdiction may prove more complex.
For example, assume that a petroleum reﬁnery in California produces
carbon dioxide emissions. It competes with reﬁneries in Texas to sell oil
on the interstate market. California might want to force its polluters to
compete to reduce reﬁnery carbon dioxide emissions. This would require
that California law allow Texas reﬁners to collect fees from California
reﬁners with lower emissions, which is not jurisdictionally problematic,
as the collection would be against a California facility under California
30. See, e.g., Ozone Depleting Chloroﬂurocarbons, Proposed Production Restriction,
45 Fed. Reg. 66,727, 66,732–33 (1980) (discussing options for addressing imports of
ozone-depleting chemicals under a proposed trading scheme to reduce their domestic
production).
31. See George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 618–19 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(explaining that antidumping provisions of the Clean Air Act required that both foreign
and domestic reﬁners comply).
32. See id. (describing and resolving controversy over compliance methodologies
for foreign reﬁneries).
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law. But it is not as clear that California would have regulatory jurisdiction
to demand that Texas reﬁners pay California reﬁners with lower emissions.
The same question could arise on the national level. For example, could
the United States demand that Venezuelan reﬁners pay U.S. reﬁners with
lower emissions under a U.S. environmental competition statute?
As a general matter, states can tax foreign polluters for activities in the
state. Thus, California, for example, would have jurisdiction to force a
Michigan car company that sells automobiles in California to pay another
car company that also sells cars in California for pollution from the cars
driven or sold in California.33 It is possible that California could also
regulate a company that contributed emissions that affected California.34
But this category might include any company in the world that emitted
carbon dioxide, so courts might be tempted to limit the reach of such an
exercise of regulatory jurisdiction. In the climate-change context, emissions
everywhere affect any state’s welfare. Outside of that context, a state
might face difﬁculty regulating facilities outside of its jurisdiction that
compete with facilities in the jurisdiction but emit nothing that affects
the regulating states.35 Either a state or the federal government would have
to consider limiting a program to embrace less than the entire market that
its companies compete in under an environmental competition statute.
Even with such limitations in place, such programs would spur a great
deal of innovation. And Congress possesses the authority to remove
impediments to state environmental competition statutes arising from the
Dormant Commerce Clause, the source of most of the potential restraints
just mentioned.36
Furthermore, states could reach informal agreements or create interstate
compacts with congressional approval to broaden the reach of their

33. The problems underlying this discussion would arise if the Supreme Court
applied its Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to an Environmental Competition
Statute. Because this statute would not tax—it does not raise revenue for the state—it is
not entirely clear that the principles of Dormant Commerce Clause tax jurisprudence
would apply to it.
34. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 561 (1997)
(requiring only some “minimum connection” between the state and the taxed entity);
Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce,
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 549, 552 (2000) (discussing the consensus among tax scholars
that states should be able to tax companies having no physical presence in the taxing
state).
35. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (holding that states
cannot impose a sales or use tax on a company lacking a physical presence in a state).
36. See id. at 318.
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programs. And nations could broaden the reach of their programs through
treaties.
Both states and federal governments would have to conform their
programs to relevant law encouraging free trade. Nation-states must
conform to World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, such as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), and regional trade agreements.
Similarly, U.S. states must conform to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which infers limits on state regulation
and taxation from congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce.
Under all of these free-trade legal regimes, polities usually may not
discriminate against companies outside their jurisdiction.37 This means
that governments must resist the temptation to make an environmental
competition statute a one-way street, absent a very strong justiﬁcation.38
If states demand that out-of-state companies with high emissions pay instate companies with low emissions, they must also demand that in-state
companies with high emissions pay out-of-state companies with low
emissions. Programs that reach out-of-state polluters must be carefully
crafted to avoid adverse rulings under free-trade law and to conform to
limits on state regulatory jurisdiction.
XI. TAKINGS
Many countries prohibit the government from taking private property
without just compensation. In most places, this poses no problem for an
environmental competition statute because the approach does not involve a
government taking of private property. The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
has created a unique body of law based on the idea that if government
regulation goes “too far,” it constitutes a taking, thus triggering a
government compensation duty. Companies would probably challenge
this law as a taking, both in the United States and possibly in Canada and
Mexico, under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). But
this challenge should fail. The Supreme Court has held that laws requiring
monetary transfers without requiring transfer of particular property do
not implicate the takings clause.39 The NAFTA tribunals are extremely
unpredictable, but they should not go beyond U.S. law on this, as Canada

37. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny
to discriminatory measures).
38. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1987) (invalidating an Ohio
tax credit given only to local ethanol producers despite a claim that the credit helped
protect the environment).
39. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539–47, 554–58 (1998) (concurring and
dissenting opinions).
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and Mexico have no regulatory takings doctrine and there is no ﬁrm support
for such a doctrine in the text of the NAFTA agreement.
A challenge on substantive due-process grounds should also fail (a
possibility in the United States, at least). The U.S. Supreme Court upholds
all laws having a mere rational basis under this doctrine. Seeking to
advance environmental protection through competition may be controversial,
but it certainly meets the minimal standards for rationality that govern
substantive due-process cases.40
Although the Court has upheld laws transferring funds from companies to
other private parties, it has struck down an especially unfair retroactive
application of one such law.41 Given the changing composition of the
Court and the concern the Court has expressed about retroactive legislation,
designers of environmental competition statutes might wish to limit the
creation of retroactive liability that might appear unfair to the Court. A
simple way to do this is to allow three years after the law goes into effect
before any liability can apply, which sound design demands anyway.
This gives those potentially subject to liability an opportunity to reduce
their emissions and thus their liability, and it avoids retroactive liability.
After all, the law’s purpose is to stimulate emission reductions, not
payments. The prospect of payments serves only as a means toward the
end of stimulating competition to clean up.

40. See generally Collins v. City of Marker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)
(unanimous opinion) (discussing Court’s reluctance to expand the substantive-due-process
doctrine).
41. Compare Pension Beneﬁt Guar. Corp. v. Connolly, 475 U.S. 211 (1986)
(upholding requirement that private companies fund retirees’ pensions after terminating a
retirement plan); Usery v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding requirement
that mining companies compensate former employees with black lung disease) with
Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 498 (striking down retroactive liability for black lung
disease for a company that never promised health protection from black lung disease).
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XII. CONCLUSION
An environmental competition statute can unleash private-sector
capacity to improve the environment with little reliance on frequently
lethargic government processes. In this sense, it emulates free market
dynamics more faithfully than emissions trading, the signature reform of
second-generation environmental law. It allows ﬁrms exercising
environmental leadership to prosper, thereby discouraging laggards from
resisting change. It can help usher in a more successful third generation
of environmental law.
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